Muddling Through: Noisy Equilibrium Selection
We examine an evolutionary model in which the primary source of "noise" that moves the model between equilibria is not random, arbitrarily improbable mutations but mistakes in learning. We find conditions under which the payoff-dominant equilibrium in a 2x2 game is selected by the model as well as conditions under which the risk- dominant equilibrium is selected. The relevant risk-dominance considerations, however, arise not in the original game but in a "fitness game" derived from the process by which payoffs in the original game are translated into evolutionary fitnesses. We also find that waiting times until the limiting distribution is reached can be shorter than in a mutation-driven model. To explore the robustness of the results to the specification of the model, we present a number of comparative static results as well as a "two-tiered" evolutionary model in which the rules by which agents learn to play the game are themselves subject to evolutionary pressure.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||Feb 1994|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany|
Fax: +49 228 73 6884
Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew, 1993.
"Rules of Thumb for Social Learning,"
3196332, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Allison, G. & Fudenberg, D., 1992. "Rules of Thumb for Social Learning," Working papers 92-12, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew, 1992. "Rules of Thumb for Social Learning," IDEI Working Papers 17, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- G. Ellison & D. Fudenberg, 2010. "Rules of Thumb for Social Learning," Levine's Working Paper Archive 435, David K. Levine.
- Glen Ellison, 2010.
"Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
391, David K. Levine.
- Noeldecke,Georg & Samuelson,Larry, .
"An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction,"
Discussion Paper Serie B
228, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Noldeke Georg & Samuelson Larry, 1993. "An Evolutionary Analysis of Backward and Forward Induction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 425-454, July.
- G. Noldeke & L. Samuelson, 2010. "An Evolutionary Analysis of Backward and Forward Induction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 538, David K. Levine.
- Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
- Carlsson, H. & Van Damme, E., 1990.
"Global Games And Equilibrium Selection,"
9052, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
- Hans Carlsson & Eric van Damme, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001088, David K. Levine.
- Carlsson, H. & van Damme, E.E.C., 1993. "Global games and equilibrium selection," Other publications TiSEM 49a54f00-dcec-4fc1-9488-4, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Carlsson, H. & van Damme, E.E.C., 1990. "Global games and equilibrium selection," Discussion Paper 1990-52, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Gilboa, Itzhak & Schmeidler, David, 1996.
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 1-26, July.
- Mark Bagnoli & Ted Bergstrom, 2005.
"Log-concave probability and its applications,"
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(2), pages 445-469, 08.
- Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L. & Vaughan, R., 1993. "Musical Chairs: Modelling Noisy Evolution," Working papers 9324, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L., 1993. "An Economist's Perspective on the Evolution of Norms," Working papers 9323, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfb:275. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (BGSE Office)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.