Duopoly strategies programmed by experienced players
This paper reports a strategy study on a twenty-period supergame of a numerically specified asymmetric Cournot duopoly. The subjects were twenty-three participants of a student seminar. Three rounds of game playing were followed by three rounds of strategy programming with computer tournaments. The final strategies show a typical approach to the strategic problem: subjects first select an 'ideal point,' a cooperative goal based on fairness criteria, and then design a 'measure for measure policy' that reciprocates movements to the ideal point or away from it; no quantitative expectations are formed and nothing is optimized. Typicalness is positively correlated with success.
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