On Organizational Decision Rules and Innovative Activity
We analyze a model in which agents exert effort to create innovations within an organization. When payments are infeasible, the decision on the implementation of a proposal is shown to be made by simple monotonic decision rules. Then we look for optimal rules in several contexts. A trade-off arises between the use of information and the incentives created by a rule. If the former dominates it will currently be optimal to install a hierarchy. Otherwise granting autonomy to the innovators may be better. The unanimity rule may be optimal if average proposals are bad for the organization and a strong filtering is necessary.
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|Date of creation:||Jul 1999|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany|
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