Robust Possibility and Impossibility Results
In a general setting of private information, the possibility (impossibility) theorem is said to be valid, if a balanced and ex post efficient mechanism exists (does not exist) which agents voluntarily participate at. Possibility and impossibility results are called robust if they hold for all priors with independently distributed private information. The following papers, among others, implicitely contain such results: Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), Gth and Hellwig (1986), Cramton, Gibbons and Klemperer (1987), McAfee (1991), Makowski and Mezzetti (1993), Williams (1994) and Schmitz (1998). The present paper introduces a criterion which does not depend on the prior distribution of information. This criterion allows, not only, to simplify drastically earlier proofs, but also to generalize the existing results in a substantial way.
|Date of creation:||Dec 1998|
|Date of revision:|
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "Simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 169-188, January.
- Peter Cramton & Robert Gibbons & Paul Klemperer, 1987.
"Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently,"
Papers of Peter Cramton
87econ, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998.
- McAfee, R. Preston, 1991. "Efficient allocation with continuous quantities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 51-74, February.
- Roger B. Myerson & Mark A. Satterthwaite, 1981.
"Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading,"
469S, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem," MPRA Paper 12530, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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