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Robust Possibility and Impossibility Results

  • Schweizer, Urs
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    In a general setting of private information, the possibility (impossibility) theorem is said to be valid, if a balanced and ex post efficient mechanism exists (does not exist) which agents voluntarily participate at. Possibility and impossibility results are called robust if they hold for all priors with independently distributed private information. The following papers, among others, implicitely contain such results: Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), Gth and Hellwig (1986), Cramton, Gibbons and Klemperer (1987), McAfee (1991), Makowski and Mezzetti (1993), Williams (1994) and Schmitz (1998). The present paper introduces a criterion which does not depend on the prior distribution of information. This criterion allows, not only, to simplify drastically earlier proofs, but also to generalize the existing results in a substantial way.

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    File URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonsfa/bonsfa590.pdf
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    File URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonsfa/bonsfa590.ps
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    Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie A with number 590.

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    Length: pages
    Date of creation: Dec 1998
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfa:590
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    Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany

    Fax: +49 228 73 6884
    Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de

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    1. Peter Cramton & Robert Gibbons & Paul Klemperer, 1987. "Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently," Papers of Peter Cramton 87econ, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998.
    2. Roger B. Myerson & Mark A. Satterthwaite, 1981. "Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading," Discussion Papers 469S, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    3. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "Simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 169-188, January.
    4. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem," MPRA Paper 12530, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. McAfee, R. Preston, 1991. "Efficient allocation with continuous quantities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 51-74, February.
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