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Contingent Commodities and Implementation

  • Chattopadhyay, Subir
  • Luis C. Corchon
  • J�rg Naeve

In this note we consider the problem whether contingent commodity allocations can be used when the states are not directly contractible. In such a setting a contingent commodity allocation takes the form of a social choice function, and the question is whether this function is implementable (in the sense of full implementation). Using only very mild assumptions on the rule for selecting contingent commodity allocations, we derive a strong negative result which also proves to be robust with respect to different solution concepts employed for implementation. These findings have interesting implications for the interpretation of Arrow-Debreu economies.

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File URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonsfa/bonsfa572.pdf
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Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Discussion Paper Serie A with number 572.

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Length: pages
Date of creation: Apr 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonsfa:572
Contact details of provider: Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany
Fax: +49 228 73 6884
Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de

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  1. Abreu, Dilip & Sen, Arunava, 1991. "Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 997-1021, July.
  2. Eric Maskin, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  3. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1998. "Incomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 902-32, September.
  4. Palfrey, Thomas R & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1989. "Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(1), pages 115-34, January.
  5. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1988. "A new approach to the implementation problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 128-144, June.
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