Experimental Investigation of a Cyclic Duopoly Game
The notion of a cyclic game has been introduced by Selten and Wooders (2001). They illustrate the concept by the analysis of a cyclic duopoly game. The experiments reported concern this game. The game was played by eleven matching groups of six players each. The observed choice fre- quencies were compared with the predictions of Nash equilibrium, impulse balance equilibrium (Selten, Abbink and Cox (2005), Selten and Chmura (2007)) and two-sample equilbrium (Osborne and Rubinstein(1998)). Pair- wise comparisons by the Wilcoxon Signed-rank test show that impulse balance equilibrium as well as two-sample equilibrium have a significantly better predictive success than Nash equilibrium. The difference between impulse balance equilibrium and two-sample equilibrium is not significant.In each matching group three players acted only in uneven periods and the other three only in even periods. This game has two pure strategy equi- libria in which both types of players behave differently. The data exhibit a weak but significant tendency in the direction of coordination at a pure strategy equilibrium.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2007|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany|
Fax: +49 228 73 6884
Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse9_2007. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (BGSE Office)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.