On the Dynamic Foundation of Evolutionary Stability in Continuous Models
We show in this paper that none of the existing static evolutionary stability concepts (ESS, CSS, uninvadability, NIS) is sufficient to guarantee dynamic stability in the weak topology with respect to standard evolutionary dynamics if the strategy space is continuous. We propose a new concept, evolutionary robustness, which is stronger than the previous concepts. Evolutionary robustness ensures dynamic stability for replicator dynamics in doubly symmetric games.
|Date of creation:||Jul 2000|
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- Bester, Helmut & Guth, Werner, 1998.
"Is altruism evolutionarily stable?,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 193-209, February.
- Bester, H. & Güth, W., 1994. "Is altruism evolutionarily stable ?," Discussion Paper 1994-103, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- J. Maynard Smith, 2010. "The Theory of Games and Evolution of Animal Conflicts," Levine's Working Paper Archive 448, David K. Levine. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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