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The Dispersion of Employees' Wage Increases and Firm Performance

  • Christian Grund
  • Niels Westergaard-Nielsen

    ()

In this contribution we examine the interrelation between intra-firm wage increases and firm performance. Previous studies have focused on the dispersion of wages in order to examine for the empirical dominance of positive monetary incentive effects compared to adverse effects due to fairness considerations. We argue that the dispersion of wage increases rather than wage levels is a crucial measure for monetary incentives in firms. The larger the dispersion of wage increases the higher the amount of monetary incentives in firms. In contrast, huge wage inequality without any promotion possibilities does not induce any monetary incentives. Evidence from unique Danish linked employer employee data shows that large dispersion of wage growth within firms is generally connected with low firm performance. The results are mainly driven by white collar rather than blue collar workers.

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File URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonedp/bgse3_2005.pdf
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Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Bonn Econ Discussion Papers with number bgse3_2005.

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Length: 28
Date of creation: Jan 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse3_2005
Contact details of provider: Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany
Fax: +49 228 73 6884
Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de

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