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On Delegation under Relational Contracts

  • Oliver Gürtler
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    The benefits and costs of different forms of job design have been analyzed in the literature yet. The focus has thereby mostly been on job designs under formal contracts between the parties. However, in the real world relational contracts - informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships - play a role as important as formal ones. This paper therefore considers the advantages and disadvantages of two different kinds of job design, partial del- egation and complete delegation with specialization, when the parties make use of both, formal and informal agreements. It is found that many of the results derived in the absence of informal contracts will no longer hold, if these contracts become available.

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    File URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/bgsepapers/bonedp/bgse32_2005.pdf
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    Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Bonn Econ Discussion Papers with number bgse32_2005.

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    Length: 35
    Date of creation: Oct 2005
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse32_2005
    Contact details of provider: Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany
    Fax: +49 228 73 6884
    Web page: http://www.bgse.uni-bonn.de

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