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Incomplete Information and Multiple Machine Queueing Problems

  • Manipushpak Mitra

In mechanism design problems under incomplete information, it is generally difficult to find decision problems that are first best implementable. A decision problem under incomplete information is first best implementable if there exists a mechanism that extracts the private information and achieves efficiency with a transfer scheme that adds up to zero in every state. One such problem is the queueing problem with one machine. In this paper we identify the conditions on cost structure for which queueing problems with multiple machines are first best implementable.

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Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Bonn Econ Discussion Papers with number bgse19_2001.

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Length: 26
Date of creation: Mar 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse19_2001
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  1. Manipushpak Mitra, 2000. "Mechanism Design in Queueing Problems," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1301, Econometric Society.
  2. Hurwicz, Leonid & Walker, Mark, 1990. "On the Generic Nonoptimality of Dominant-Strategy Allocation Mechanisms: A General Theorem That Includes Pure Exchange Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(3), pages 683-704, May.
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  9. Curiel, Imma & Pederzoli, Giorgio & Tijs, Stef, 1989. "Sequencing games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 344-351, June.
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  12. Jeroen Suijs, 1996. "On incentive compatibility and budget balancedness in public decision making," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 193-209, December.
  13. van den Nouweland, Anne & Krabbenborg, Marc & Potters, Jos, 1992. "Flow-shops with a dominant machine," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 38-46, October.
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