IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Evolution and Correlated Equilibrium

  • Lars Koch


Registered author(s):

    We show that a set of outcomes outside the convex hull of Nash equilibria can be asymptotically stable with respect to convex monotonic evolutionary dynamics. Boundedly rational agents receive signals and condition the choice of strategies on the signals. A set of conditional strategies is asymptotically stable only if it represents a strict (correlated-)equilibrium set. There are correlated equilibria that cannot be represented by an asymptotically stable signal contingent strategy. For generic games it is shown that if signals are endogenous but no player has an incentive to manipulate the signal generating process and if the signal contingent strategy is asymptotically stable, then and only then, the outcome must be a strict Nash equilibrium.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Bonn Econ Discussion Papers with number bgse14_2008.

    in new window

    Length: 30
    Date of creation: Jun 2008
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse14_2008
    Contact details of provider: Postal:
    Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany

    Fax: +49 228 73 6884
    Web page:

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. Lenzo, Justin & Sarver, Todd, 2006. "Correlated equilibrium in evolutionary models with subpopulations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 271-284, August.
    2. Aumann, Robert J, 1987. "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 1-18, January.
    3. J. Hofbauer & J. Weibull, 2010. "Evolutionary Selection against dominated strategies," Levine's Working Paper Archive 444, David K. Levine.
    4. George J. mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked, . "Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions," ELSE working papers 030, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
    5. AUMANN, Robert J. & DREZE, Jacques H., 2005. "When all is said and done, how should you play and what should you expect ?," CORE Discussion Papers 2005021, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    6. Aumann, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March.
    7. Karl H. Schlag & Dieter Balkenborg, 2001. "Evolutionarily stable sets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 29(4), pages 571-595.
    8. repec:dau:papers:123456789/1061 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Balkenborg, Dieter & Schlag, Karl H., 2007. "On the evolutionary selection of sets of Nash equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 295-315, March.
    10. Cripps, Martin, 1991. "Correlated equilibria and evolutionary stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 428-434, December.
    11. Yannick Viossat, 2007. "The replicator dynamics does not lead to correlated equilibria," Post-Print hal-00664293, HAL.
    12. Swinkels, Jeroen M., 1992. "Evolution and strategic stability: From maynard smith to kohlberg and mertens," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 333-342, August.
    13. Samuelson, Larry & Zhang, Jianbo, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 363-391, August.
    14. Yannick Viossat, 2004. "Replicator Dynamics and Correlated Equilibrium," Working Papers hal-00242953, HAL.
    15. Ritzberger, Klaus & Weibull, Jörgen W., 1993. "Evolutionary Selection in Normal Form Games," Working Paper Series 383, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse14_2008. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (BGSE Office)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.