Group size and free riding when private and public goods are gross substitutes
Using the traditional model of voluntary public good provision, it is shown that an expansion of group size exacerbates free riding tendencies as long as private consumption and the public good are strictly normal and weak gross substitutes. This result generalizes a previous Cobb-Douglas example with respect to preferences and asymmetric equilibria.
|Date of creation:||Dec 1999|
|Date of revision:||May 2000|
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- Cornes, Richard & Hartley, Roger & Sandler, Todd, 1999.
" Equilibrium Existence and Uniqueness in Public Good Models: An Elementary Proof via Contraction,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory,
Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 1(4), pages 499-509.
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- Cornes, Richard & Hartley, Roger & Sandler, Todd, 1999. "Equilibrium Existence and Uniqueness in Public Good Models: An Elementary Proof Via Contraction," Staff General Research Papers 1630, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Fries, Timothy L & Golding, Edward & Romano, Richard E, 1991. "Private Provision of Public Goods and the Failure of the Neutrality Property in Large Finite Economies," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(1), pages 147-57, February.
- R. M. Isaac & J. M. Walker, 2010.
"Group size effects in public goods provision: The voluntary contribution mechanism,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
310, David K. Levine.
- Isaac, R Mark & Walker, James M, 1988. "Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(1), pages 179-99, February.
- Isaac, R. Mark & Walker, James M. & Williams, Arlington W., 1994. "Group size and the voluntary provision of public goods : Experimental evidence utilizing large groups," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 1-36, May.
- Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February.
- Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1988. "Fundamentals of Public Economics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121271, June.
- Cornes, Richard & Sandler, Todd, 1984. "Easy Riders, Joint Production, and Public Goods," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(375), pages 580-98, September.
- Lipford, Jody W, 1995. " Group Size and the Free-Rider Hypothesis: An Examination of New Evidence from Churches," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 83(3-4), pages 291-303, June.
- Pecorino, Paul, 1999. "The effect of group size on public good provision in a repeated game setting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 121-134, April.
- Bergstrom, Ted C. & Blume, Larry & Varian, Hal, 1992. "Uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in private provision of public goods : An improved proof," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 391-392, December.
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