IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Sovereign Borrowing, Financial Assistance and Debt Repudiation

  • Florian Kirsch


  • Ronald Rühmkorf


Official lenders provide financial assistance to countries that face sovereign debt crisis. The availability of financial assistance has counteracting effects on the default incentives of governments. On the one hand, financial assistance can help to avoid defaults by bridging times of fundamental crises or resolving coordination failures among private investors. On the other hand, the insurance effect of financial assistance lowers borrowing costs which induces the sovereign to accumulate higher debt levels. To assess the overall effect of financial assistance on the probability of default we construct a quantitative model of endogenous credit structure and sovereign default that allows for self-fulfilling expectations of default. Calibrating the model to Argentinean data we find that the availability of financial assistance reduces the number of defaults that occur due to self-fulfilling runs by private investors. However, at the same time it raises average debt levels causing an overall increase of the probability of default.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by University of Bonn, Germany in its series Bonn Econ Discussion Papers with number bgse01_2013.

in new window

Length: 33
Date of creation: Jan 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse01_2013
Contact details of provider: Postal: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany
Fax: +49 228 73 6884
Web page:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Satyajit Chatterjee & Burcu Eyigungor, 2009. "Maturity, indebtedness, and default risk," Working Papers 09-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  2. Lizarazo, Sandra, 2010. "Default Risk and Risk Averse International Investors," MPRA Paper 20794, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Cole, Harold L. & Kehoe, Timothy J., 1996. "A self-fulfilling model of Mexico's 1994-1995 debt crisis," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-4), pages 309-330, November.
  4. Harold L. Cole & Timothy J. Kehoe, 1998. "Self-fulfilling debt crises," Staff Report 211, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  5. Mark Aguiar & Gita Gopinath, 2004. "Defaultable debt, interest rates and the current account," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Jun.
  6. Jeromin Zettelmeyer & Federico Sturzenegger, 2005. "Haircuts: Estimating Investor Losses in Sovereign Debt Restructurings, 1998-2005," IMF Working Papers 05/137, International Monetary Fund.
  7. Reinhart, Carmen, 2009. "The Second Great Contraction," MPRA Paper 21485, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Vivian Z. Yue & Enrique G. Mendoza, 2011. "A General Equilibrium Model of Sovereign Default and Business Cycles," IMF Working Papers 11/166, International Monetary Fund.
  9. Eaton, Jonathan & Gersovitz, Mark, 1981. "Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(2), pages 289-309, April.
  10. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2004. "Catalytic Finance: When Does It Work?," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm339, Yale School of Management.
  11. Hatchondo, Juan Carlos & Martinez, Leonardo, 2009. "Long-duration bonds and sovereign defaults," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 117-125, September.
  12. Calvo, Guillermo A, 1988. "Servicing the Public Debt: The Role of Expectations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 647-61, September.
  13. Neumeyer, Pablo Andrés & Perri, Fabrizio, 2004. "Business Cycles in Emerging Economies: The Role of Interest Rates," CEPR Discussion Papers 4482, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  14. Gaston Gelos & Guido Sandleris & Ratna Sahay, 2004. "Sovereign Borrowing by Developing Countries: What Determines Market Access?," IMF Working Papers 04/221, International Monetary Fund.
  15. Fabian Fink & Almuth Scholl, 2011. "A Quantitative Model of Sovereign Debt, Bailouts and Conditionality," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2011-46, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
  16. Emine Boz, 2009. "Sovereign Default, Private Sector Creditors and the IFIs," IMF Working Papers 09/46, International Monetary Fund.
  17. Graham Bird, 2007. "The Imf: A Bird'S Eye View Of Its Role And Operations," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(4), pages 683-745, 09.
  18. Harold L. Cole & Timothy J. Kehoe, 1996. "A self-fulfilling model of Mexico's 1994-95 debt crisis," Staff Report 210, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  19. Arellano, Cristina, 2008. "Default risk and income fluctuations in emerging economies," MPRA Paper 7867, University Library of Munich, Germany.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse01_2013. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (BGSE Office)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.