Uncertainty and Strategic Interaction in Economics
The endogeneity of equilibrium strategies makes modelling uncertainty about the behaviour of other economic players difficult. Recent developments in decision and game theory offer an opportunity to include strategic uncertainty as an explanatory variable in economic analysis. This paper introduces to a new concept of decision making under uncertainty and an adapted notion of strategic equilibriu,. With these tools, several well-known economic models of strategic interaction are re-examined. These applications provide an opportunity to assess the contribution of uncertainty for a better understand ing of strategic interaction in economies.
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|Date of creation:||1999|
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