Entrepreneurship, Credit COnstraints and Education: A Model of Interdependent Loan Decisions
A macroeconomic model with endogenous credit constraints due to a moral hazard problem in lending is developed. There are two sequential borrowing decisions; first, an agent may wish to borrow to become educated and secondly, an educated agent may wish to borrow to become an entrepreneur. The possibility of rationing of entrepreneurship loans may affect the likelihood that loans are made for education purposes.
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|Date of creation:||1998|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Edgbaston, Birmingham, B15 2TT|
Web page: http://www.economics.bham.ac.uk
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