The Structure of Strongly Monotonic Probabilistic Voting Procedures
Pattanaik and Peleg showed that the power structure under a probabilistic voting procedure which satisfies regularity, ex-post Pareto optimally and independance of irrelevant alternatives is almost completely characterized by random dictatorship. Their characterization is not complete because it requires some additional conditions. We propose a new probabilistic monotonicity axiom called strong monotonicity and show that, if the probabilistic voting procedure is required to satisfy this new axiom along with their 3 axioms, then the distribution of coalitional power under it is completely characterized by random dictatorship.
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|Date of creation:||1998|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Edgbaston, Birmingham, B15 2TT|
Web page: http://www.economics.bham.ac.uk
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