Uncertainty in Partnerships
In this paper we analyse the consequences of Knightian uncertainty for partnerships with symmetric linear production functions are analysed in a CEU framework. We propose an extension of Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for CEU-games with strategic uncertainty. We find that the presence of uncertainty does not change equilibrium choices of effort levels of partnerships with a linear sharing rule.
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|Date of creation:||1997|
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Web page: http://www.economics.bham.ac.uk
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