Building Blocks in the Economics of Mandates
The paper constructs an asymmetric information model to investugate the efficiency and equity cases for government mandated benefits. A mandate can improve workers' ibsurance, and may also redistribute in favour of more "deserving" workers.
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|Date of creation:||2000|
|Date of revision:|
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Web page: http://www.economics.bham.ac.uk
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- Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
- Krueger, Alan B., 2000. "From Bismarck to Maastricht: The March to European Union and the Labor Compact1," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 117-134, March.
- Christopher J. Ruhm, 1996.
"The Economic Consequences of Parental Leave Mandates: Lessons from Europe,"
NBER Working Papers
5688, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Christopher J. Ruhm, 1998. "The Economic Consequences of Parental Leave Mandates: Lessons from Europe," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 113(1), pages 285-317.
- Hellwig,Martin, 1986.
"Some recent developments in the theory of competition in markets with adverse selection,"
Discussion Paper Serie A
82, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Hellwig, Martin, 1987. "Some recent developments in the theory of competition in markets with adverse selection ," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(1-2), pages 319-325.
- Aghion, Philippe & Hermalin, Benjamin, 1990.
"Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency,"
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization,
Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 381-409, Fall.
- Aghion, P. & Hermalin, B., 1990. "Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency," DELTA Working Papers 90-14, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
- Hopenhayn, Hugo & Rogerson, Richard, 1993. "Job Turnover and Policy Evaluation: A General Equilibrium Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(5), pages 915-38, October.
- Wilson, Charles, 1977. "A model of insurance markets with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 167-207, December.
- Levine, David I, 1991. "Just-Cause Employment Policies in the Presence of Worker Adverse Selection," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 9(3), pages 294-305, July.
- Dionne, Georges & Lasserre, Pierre, 1987. "Adverse selection and finite-horizon insurance contracts," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 843-861, June.
- Summers, Lawrence H, 1989. "Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(2), pages 177-83, May.
- Cooper, Russell & Hayes, Beth, 1987. "Multi-period insurance contracts," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 211-231.
- Alan B. Krueger, 2000.
"From Bismarck to Maastricht: The March to European Union and the Labor Compact,"
NBER Working Papers
7456, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alan Krueger, 1999. "From Bismarck to Maastricht: The March to European Union and the Labor Compact," Working Papers 803, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
- Stewart, Jay, 1994. "The Welfare Implications of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in Competitive Insurance Markets," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 32(2), pages 193-208, April.
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