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The Effects of Fiscal and Monetary Discipline on Budgetary Outcomes : The Case of the European Union

  • Bilin Neyaptý

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  • Secil Ozgur

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File URL: http://www.bilkent.edu.tr/~economy/paper/99_6.pdf
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Paper provided by Bilkent University, Department of Economics in its series Departmental Working Papers with number 996.

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Date of creation: 1999
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Handle: RePEc:bil:bilpap:996
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  1. Ozkan, F Gulcin & Sibert, Anne & Sutherland, Alan, 1997. "Monetary Union, Entry Conditions and Economic Reform," CEPR Discussion Papers 1720, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-62, May.
  3. Cukierman, Alex & Lippi, Francesco, 1999. "Central bank independence, centralization of wage bargaining, inflation and unemployment:: Theory and some evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(7), pages 1395-1434, June.
  4. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 6(3), pages 353-98, September.
  5. International Monetary Fund, 1996. "Budget Processes and Commitment to Fiscal Discipline," IMF Working Papers 96/78, International Monetary Fund.
  6. Joshua Aizenman & Ricardo Hausmann, 1995. "The Impact of Inflation on Budgetary Discipline," NBER Working Papers 5338, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Eijffinger, S. & De Hann, J., 1995. "The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence," Papers 9587, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  8. Alesina, Alberto & Gatti, Roberta, 1995. "Independent Central Banks: Low Inflation at No Cost?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 196-200, May.
  9. Jürgen Hagen & Stefan Lutz, 1996. "Fiscal and monetary policy on the way to EMU," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 7(4), pages 299-325, October.
  10. Waller, Christopher J & Walsh, Carl E, 1996. "Central-Bank Independence, Economic Behavior, and Optimal Term Lengths," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(5), pages 1139-53, December.
  11. Beetsma, Roel & Uhlig, Harald, 1999. "An Analysis of the Stability and Growth Pact," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(458), pages 546-71, October.
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