On the Existence of Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria in Bayesian Games
We generalize Athey's (2001) and McAdams' (2003) results on the existence of monotone pure strategy equilibria in Bayesian games. We allow action spaces to be compact locally-complete metrizable semilattices and type spaces to be partially ordered probability spaces. Our proof is based upon contractibility rather than convexity of best reply sets. Several examples illustrate the scope of the result, including new applications to multi-unit auctions with risk-averse bidders.
|Date of creation:||2009|
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