A simple dynamic climate cooperation model
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Other versions of this item:
- Schmidt, Robert & Kovac, Eugen, 2016. "A simple dynamic climate cooperation model," Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145481, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
References listed on IDEAS
- Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-894, Supplemen.
- Michael Hoel & Kerstin Schneider, 1997. "Incentives to participate in an international environmental agreement," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 9(2), pages 153-170, March.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Hiroaki SAKAMOTO & Larry KARP, 2019. "Sober optimism and the formation of international environmental agreements," Discussion papers e-19-002, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University.
- Larry Karp & Hiroaki Sakamoto, 2018. "International environmental agreements without commitment," 2018 Meeting Papers 508, Society for Economic Dynamics.
More about this item
Keywordsclimate treaty; coalition; dynamic game; coordination; delay;
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-CDM-2016-01-29 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-ENE-2016-01-29 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2016-01-29 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2016-01-29 (Game Theory)
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