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Insolvenzplan, optionsbasierte Lösungen, Verlustvorträge und vom Gesetzgeber verursachte Sanierungshemmnisse

  • Drukarczyk, Jochen
  • Schöntag, Stefanie
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    Wie die Rechtskleider aussehen sollten, die Sanierungsprozesse für Unternehmen lenken und strukturieren, ist eine sehr interessante und relevante Frage. Wir greifen aus diesem Problemfeld einen Teilaspekt heraus: Wir unterstellen, daß das Unternehmen insolvent gemäß den Kriterien des relevanten Rechtskleides ist, daß also Workouts oder freie Sanierungen bereits erfolglos stattgefunden haben oder versäumt worden sind. Die zentrale Frage ist jetzt, wie eine den Wert günstig gestaltende Verwertung des Vermögens gefunden werden kann und wie der Verteilungsprozeß dieses Wertes zu gestalten ist. Der Wert der Verwertungsform hängt ab von operativen Entscheidungen, aber auch von der Finanzierung des neuen Unternehmens, der Zeitdauer und den Kosten des gewählten Verfahrens, der Effizienz der während des Verfahrens zu treffenden Entscheidungen und der Nutzung der i.d.R. bestehenden Verlustvorträge. Die Ergebnisse des Verteilungsprozesses hängen entscheidend von den Vorgaben des Rechtskleides für den Verteilungsprozeß ab. Wir stellen die Vorgaben des Rechtskleides der Insolvenzordnung einem optionsbasierten Procedere, das Bebchuk und Aghion/Hart/Moore vorgeschlagen haben, gegenüber. Anhand eines dreiperiodigen Beispielfalles entwickeln wir mögliche Bewertungs- und Wertzuweisungsergebnisse und zeigen, daß und wie Eigenschaften des Rechtskleides auf Wert und Wertzuteilung wirken. The success of a corporate restructuring depends not only on the know-how of the turnaround-managers but also on the structure of the legal framework. In this paper we analyze the influence of German insolvency law and tax regime on the value of the economic positions of creditors and owners of insolvent firms. We differentiate creditors in secured and unsecured claimholders and analyze the outcome for both groups and also for the owners of the insolvent company in German insolvency plan procedure. We compare these results with those of options models proposed e.g. by Bebchuk or Aghion/Hart/Moore. Finally, we introduce a 3-period example and show how insolvency procedure influences going concern value and the division of value between creditors and owners.

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    File URL: http://epub.uni-regensburg.de/4532/1/disk_414_insolvenzplan_jd_sts_072006.pdf
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    Paper provided by University of Regensburg, Department of Economics in its series University of Regensburg Working Papers in Business, Economics and Management Information Systems with number 414.

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    Date of creation: 2006
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    Handle: RePEc:bay:rdwiwi:692
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    1. Philippe Aghion & Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1992. "The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform," CEP Discussion Papers dp0093, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    2. Eberhart, Allan C & Moore, William T & Roenfeldt, Rodney L, 1990. " Security Pricing and Deviations from the Absolute Priority Rule in Bankruptcy Proceedings," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(5), pages 1457-69, December.
    3. Michael C. Jensen, 1991. "Corporate Control And The Politics Of Finance," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 4(2), pages 13-34.
    4. Gilson, Stuart C, 1997. " Transactions Costs and Capital Structure Choice: Evidence from Financially Distressed Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(1), pages 161-96, March.
    5. Weiss, Lawrence A., 1990. "Bankruptcy resolution: Direct costs and violation of priority of claims," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 285-314, October.
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