On the absorbability of the Guessing Game Theory. A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis
Theory absorption, a notion introduced by Morgenstern and Schwödiauer (1972) and further elaborated by Güth and Kliemt (2004), discusses the problem whether a theory can survive its own acceptance. Whereas this holds for strategic equilibria according to the assumptions on which they are based, the problem if theories are absorbable by at most boundedly rational decision makers is hardly discussed. Based on guessing game experiments we discuss the requirements of equilibrium theory absorption and test experimentally the effects of informing none, some or all players about how to derive equilibrium predictions.
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|Date of revision:||Apr 2007|
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