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The Merits of New Pollutants and How to Get Them When Patents Are Granted

  • Grischa Perino

    ()

    (University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics)

The performance of market based environmental regulation is affected by patents and vice versa. This interaction is studied for a new type of innovation where new technologies reduce emissions of a specific pollutant but at the same time cause a new type of damage. A robust finding is that the efficiency of permits is affected by monopoly pricing of the patent-holding firm. This result carries over to other types of innovation. Taxes are inefficient if technologies produce perfect substitutes and share all scarce inputs. Moreover, the optimal tax on pollution might be negative.

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File URL: http://www.uni-heidelberg.de/md/awi/forschung/dp426.pdf
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Paper provided by University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 0426.

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Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2006
Date of revision: Jul 2006
Handle: RePEc:awi:wpaper:0426
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  1. Grischa Perino, 2006. "The Merits of New Pollutants and How to Get Them When Patents Are Granted," Working Papers 0426, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2006.
  2. Andreas Lange & Ulf Moslener, 2004. "A Bird in the Hand is Worth Two in the Bush? When Do We Prefer Something Certainly Dirty to Something Perhaps Clean?," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 35-51, 07.
  3. V. Denicolo, 1997. "Pollution-Reducing Innovations Under Taxes or Permits," Working Papers 281, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  4. Michael Greenstone, 2003. "Estimating Regulation-Induced Substitution: The Effect of the Clean Air Act on Water and Ground Pollution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(2), pages 442-448, May.
  5. Timo Goeschl & Grischa Perino, 2006. "Innovation Without Magic Bullets: Stock Pollution and R&D Sequences," Working Papers 0436, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, revised Dec 2006.
  6. Milliman, Scott R. & Prince, Raymond, 1989. "Firm incentives to promote technological change in pollution control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 247-265, November.
  7. Requate, Till, 2005. "Dynamic incentives by environmental policy instruments--a survey," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2-3), pages 175-195, August.
  8. Requate, Till & Unold, Wolfram, 2003. "Environmental policy incentives to adopt advanced abatement technology:: Will the true ranking please stand up?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 125-146, February.
  9. Devlin, R.A. & Grafton, R.Q., 1993. "Tradeable Permits, Missing Markets, and Technology," Working Papers 9301e, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
  10. Chakravorty, Ujjayant & Roumasset, James & Tse, Kinping, 1997. "Endogenous Substitution among Energy Resources and Global Warming," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(6), pages 1201-34, December.
  11. Winkler, Ralph, 2005. "Structural change with joint production of consumption and environmental pollution: a neo-Austrian approach," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 111-135, March.
  12. Lori D. Snyder & Nolan H. Miller & Robert N. Stavins, 2003. "The Effects of Environmental Regulation on Technology Diffusion: The Case of Chlorine Manufacturing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(2), pages 431-435, May.
  13. Requate, Till, 2003. "Commitment and Timing of Environmental Policy, Adoption of New Technology and Repercussions on R&D," Economics Working Papers 2003,07, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics.
  14. Parry, Ian & Pizer, William & Fischer, Carolyn, 1998. "Instrument Choice for Environmental Protection When Technological Innovation is Endogenous," Discussion Papers dp-99-04, Resources For the Future.
  15. Kathryn Harrison & Werner Antweiler, 2003. "Incentives for pollution abatement: Regulation, regulatory threats, and non-governmental pressures," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 22(3), pages 361-382.
  16. Jung, Chulho & Krutilla, Kerry & Boyd, Roy, 1996. "Incentives for Advanced Pollution Abatement Technology at the Industry Level: An Evaluation of Policy Alternatives," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 95-111, January.
  17. Sjak Smulders & Lucas Bretschger & Hannes Egli, 2005. "Economic growth and the diffusion of clean technologies : explaining environmental Kuznets," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 05/42, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
  18. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1996. "Pollution permits and environmental innovation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(1-2), pages 127-140, October.
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