"Efficient Bargains" as a Wage-Compliance Device in Industries with Market Power
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Other versions of this item:
- Vlassis, M., 1999. ""Efficient Bargains" as a Wage-Compliance Device in Industries with Market Power," Athens University of Economics and Business 107, Athens University of Economics and Business, Department of International and European Economic Studies.
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KeywordsWAGES ; OLIGOPOLIES ; LABOUR MARKET;
- J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General
- J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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