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Time-consistent policies

  • Karp, Larry S.

    ()

    (University of California, Berkeley. Dept of agricultural and resource economics and policy)

  • Lee, In Ho

In many cases the optimal open-loop policy to influence agents who solve dynamic problems is time-inconsistent. We show how to construct a time-consistent open-loop policy rule. We also consider an additional restriction under which the time-consistent open-loop policy is stationary. We use examples to illustrate the properties of these tax rules.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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File URL: http://repositories.cdlib.org/are_ucb/919/
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Paper provided by University of California at Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Policy in its series CUDARE Working Paper Series with number 919.

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Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:are:cudare:919
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Order Information: Postal: University of California, Giannini Foundation of Agricultural Economics Library, 248 Giannini Hall #3310, Berkeley CA 94720-3310
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  1. Stokey, Nancy L., 1991. "Credible public policy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 627-656, October.
  2. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
  3. Karp, L., 1992. "Depreciation erodes the coase conjecture," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9210, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  4. Ngo Van Long & Koji Shimomura, 2000. "Semi-Stationary Equilibrium in Leader-Follower Games," CIRANO Working Papers 2000s-08, CIRANO.
  5. Gilles Oudiz & Jeffrey Sachs, 1984. "International Policy Coordination in Dynamic Macroeconomic Models," NBER Working Papers 1417, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Miller, Marcus & Salmon, Mark, 1983. "Dynamic Games and the Time Inconsistency of Optimal Policy in Open Economies," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 232, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  7. Tsutsui, Shunichi & Mino, Kazuo, 1990. "Nonlinear strategies in dynamic duopolistic competition with sticky prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 136-161, October.
  8. Chamley, Christophe, 1986. "Optimal Taxation of Capital Income in General Equilibrium with Infinite Lives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 607-22, May.
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