Rational exaggeration in information aggregation games
This paper studies a class of information aggregation models which we call â€œaggregation games.â€ It departs from the related literature in two main respects: information is aggregated by averaging rather than majority rule, and each player selects from a continuum of reports rather than making a binary choice. Each member of a group receives a private signal, then submits a report to the center, who makes a decision based on the average of these reports. The essence of an aggregation game is that heterogeneous players engage in a â€œtug-of-war,â€ as they attempt to manipulate the centerâ€™s decision process by mis-reporting their private information. When players have distinct biases, almost of them rationally exaggerate the extent of these biases. The degree of exaggeration increases with the number of players: if the game is sufficiently large, then almost all players exaggerate to the maximum admissible extent, regardless of their individual signals. In the limit, the connection between playersâ€™ private information and the outcome of the game is obliterated.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
|Date of creation:||2008|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 207 Giannini Hall #3310, Berkeley, CA 94720-3310|
Phone: (510) 642-3345
Fax: (510) 643-8911
Web page: http://areweb.berkeley.edu/library/Main/CUDARE
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Postal: University of California, Giannini Foundation of Agricultural Economics Library, 248 Giannini Hall #3310, Berkeley CA 94720-3310|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1997.
"Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
1560, David K. Levine.
- Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1997. "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(5), pages 1029-1058, September.
- Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1994. "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information," Discussion Papers 1117, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 2001.
"A Model of Expertise,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 116(2), pages 747-775.
- Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1999. "A Model of Expertise," Working Papers 154, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Discussion Papers in Economics.
- Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1999. "A Model of Expertise," Game Theory and Information 9902003, EconWPA.
- Krishna, V. & Morgan, J., 1999. "A Model of Expertise," Papers 206, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
- Athey, Susan, 2001.
"Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information,"
Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 861-89, July.
- Athey, S., 1997. "Sigle Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information," Working papers 97-11, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Piketty, Thomas, 1999. "The information-aggregation approach to political institutions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 791-800, April.
- Gruner, Hans Peter & Kiel, Alexandra, 2004. "Collective decisions with interdependent valuations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(5), pages 1147-1168, October.
- Milgrom, Paul & Shannon, Chris, 1994.
"Monotone Comparative Statics,"
Econometric Society, vol. 62(1), pages 157-80, January.
- John Morgan & Phillip C. Stocken, 2008. "Information Aggregation in Polls," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 864-96, June.
- Gerling, Kerstin & Gruner, Hans Peter & Kiel, Alexandra & Schulte, Elisabeth, 2005.
"Information acquisition and decision making in committees: A survey,"
European Journal of Political Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 563-597, September.
- Kiel, Alexandra & Gerling, Kerstin & Schulte, Elisabeth & Grüner, Hans Peter, 2003. "Information acquisition and decision making in committees: a survey," Working Paper Series 0256, European Central Bank.
- Ronny Razin, 2003. "Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(4), pages 1083-1119, 07.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:are:cudare:1067. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jeff Cole)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.