IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Exploring long-term land improvements under land tenure insecurity

  • Myyra, Sami
  • Pietola, Kyosti

This article explores long-term land improvement (lime application) under land tenure insecurity on leased land. The dynamic optimisation problem is solved by a stochastic dynamic programming routine with known parameters for one-period returns and transition equations. The model parameters represent Finnish soil quality and production conditions. The farmer's decision rules are solved for alternative likelihood scenarios over the continuation of the fixed term lease contract. The results suggest that, as the probability for non-renewal of the lease contract increases, farmers quickly decrease investments in irreversible land improvement and, thereafter, yields decline gradually. The estimated decision rules are a part of larger set of farmer's decision rules to be taken care when land leasing and environmental legislation is renewed.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://purl.umn.edu/31954
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by New Zealand Agricultural and Resource Economics Society in its series 2006 Conference, August 24-25, 2006, Nelson, New Zealand with number 31954.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ags:nzar06:31954
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.nzares.org.nz/

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Sjaastad, Espen & Bromley, Daniel W., 1997. "Indigenous land rights in sub-Saharan Africa: Appropriation, security and investment demand," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 549-562, January.
  2. Holden, Stein & Yohannes, Hailu, 2001. "Land redistribution, tenure insecurity, and intensity of production: a study of farm households in southern Ethiopia," CAPRi working papers 21, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
  3. Li, Guo & Rozelle, Scott & Brandt, Loren, 1998. "Tenure, land rights, and farmer investment incentives in China," Agricultural Economics, Blackwell, vol. 19(1-2), pages 63-71, September.
  4. Klaus Deininger, 2003. "Land Policies for Growth and Poverty Reduction," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 15125, September.
  5. Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680, March.
  6. Abhijit Banerjee & Lakshmi Iyer, 2010. "History Institutions and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India," Working Papers id:2811, eSocialSciences.
  7. Sami Myyrä & Elise Ketoja & Markku Yli-Halla & Kyöisti Pietola, 2005. "Land Improvements under Land Tenure Insecurity: The Case of pH and Phosphate in Finland," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 81(4).
  8. Richard Bellman, 1957. "On a Dynamic Programming Approach to the Caterer Problem--I," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 3(3), pages 270-278, April.
  9. Li, Guo & Rozelle, Scott & Brandt, Loren, 1998. "Tenure, land rights, and farmer investment incentives in China," Agricultural Economics of Agricultural Economists, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 19(1-2), September.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:nzar06:31954. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (AgEcon Search)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.