Male Wages and Female Welfare: Private Markets, Public Goods, and Intrahousehold Inequality
Can an increase in male wages make the woman in the family, or even the whole family, worse off? On the face of it, this seems paradoxical, since the overall resources of the household are improved by the wage increase. This paper shows that the chain reactions set in motion by such a wage increase in labor markets can end up by making not only the woman but the whole family worse off because of the interactions between intrahousehold public goods, extrahousehold public goods, and the outcomes in conventional labor markets. The key is specialization of males and females in different activities, the public goods characteristics of some of these activities, and the effects of the outside options defined by these activities on intrahousehold bargaining.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2002|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://aem.cornell.edu/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kooreman, P. & Kapteyn, A.J., 1990. "On the empirical implementation of some game theoretic models of household labor supply," Other publications TiSEM 4c9bb2ae-f1e6-4924-8cae-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Gary S. Becker, 1981. "A Treatise on the Family," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number beck81-1.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:cudawp:127293. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (AgEcon Search)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.