An Economic Theory of Academic Competition: Dynamic Incentives and Endogenous Cumulative Advantages
In: Conferences on New Political Economy
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- Nicolas Carayol, 2008. "An economic theory of academic competition: dynamic incentives and endogenous cumulative advantages," Post-Print hal-00652492, HAL.
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- Craig Andrea & Vierø Marie-Louise, 2013.
"Academia or the Private Sector? Sorting of Agents into Institutions and an Outside Sector,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics,
De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 303-345, December.
- Andrea Craig & Marie-Louise VierÃ¸, 2008. "Academia or the Private Sector? Sorting of Agents into Institutions and an Outside Sector," Working Papers 1198, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Carayol, Nicolas & Matt, Mireille, 2004. "Does research organization influence academic production?: Laboratory level evidence from a large European university," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 33(8), pages 1081-1102, October.
- Carayol, Nicolas & Dalle, Jean-Michel, 2007. "Sequential problem choice and the reward system in Open Science," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 167-191, June.
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