New Paradigms in Central Banking?
This paper reviews whether and how the ongoing financial crisis has influenced central banking policy practice. Taking a historical perspective, it argues that throughout the existence of central banks the main objective has remained the same¯stability. What has been evolving over time, and has been influenced by the crisis, is our understanding about how to achieve and maintain stability over time. The paper focuses on the role and relative importance of price stability, economic stability and financial stability arguing that while the crisis has not materially shifted views regarding the monetary policy framework, it has highlighted the need for greater emphasis on financial stability than was appreciated before the crisis. It further argues that central banks must not only have a strong role in macro-prudential supervision but have more direct involvement in micro-supervision of the banking sector. Lastly, the paper argues that the crisis has reaffirmed that strong economic governance is a prerequisite for stability in a monetary union and, in the context of the euro area sovereign crisis, discusses the tremendous costs stemming from of lack of sufficient progress regarding economic governance going forward.
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Athanasios Orphanides & John C. Williams, 2002.
"Robust Monetary Policy Rules with Unknown Natural Rates,"
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,
Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 33(2), pages 63-146.
- Athanasios Orphanides & John C. Williams, 2003. "Robust monetary policy rules with unknown natural rates," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2003-11, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Athanasios Orphanides & John C. Williams, 2002. "Robust monetary policy rules with unknown natural rates," Working Paper Series 2003-01, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
- Orphanides, Athanasios & Williams, John C, 2010.
"Monetary Policy Mistakes and the Evolution of Inflation Expectations,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
7892, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Athanasios Orphanides & John C. Williams, 2012. "Monetary Policy Mistakes and the Evolution of Inflation Expectations," NBER Chapters, in: The Great Inflation: The Rebirth of Modern Central Banking, pages 255-288 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Athanasios Orphanides & John Williams, 2011. "Monetary Policy Mistakes and the Evolution of Inflation Expectations," NBER Working Papers 17080, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Athanasios Orphanides & John C. Williams, 2010. "Monetary policy mistakes and the evolution of inflation expectations," Working Paper Series 2010-12, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
- Athanasios Orphanides & John C. Williams, 2010. "Monetary Policy Mistakes and the Evolution of Inflation Expectations," Working Papers 2010-2, Central Bank of Cyprus.
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