Deposit Insurance Schemes - Lessons from the Crisis for CESEE Banking Systems
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Reint Gropp & Jukka Vesala, 2004.
"Deposit Insurance, Moral Hazard and Market Monitoring,"
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- Hovakimian, Armen & Kane, Edward J. & Laeven, Luc, 2002. "How Country and Safety-Net Characteristics Affect Bank Risk-Shifting," CEI Working Paper Series 2002-10, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Armen Hovakimian & Edward J. Kane & Luc Laeven, 2002. "How Country and Safety-Net Characteristics Affect Bank Risk-Shifting," NBER Working Papers 9322, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Karels, Gordon V. & McClatchey, Christine A., 1999. "Deposit insurance and risk-taking behavior in the credit union industry," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 105-134, January.
- Angkinand, Apanard & Wihlborg, Clas, 2010. "Deposit insurance coverage, ownership, and banks' risk-taking in emerging markets," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 252-274, March.
- Alston Lee J. & Grove Wayne A. & Wheelock David C., 1994. "Why Do Banks Fail? Evidence from the 1920s," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 409-431, October.
- Gueyie, Jean-Pierre & Lai, Van Son, 2003. "Bank moral hazard and the introduction of official deposit insurance in Canada," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 247-273. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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