Consider the following social choice problem. A group of individuals seek to classify the elements of X as belonging in one of two sets. The individuals may disagree as to how the elements of X should be classified, and so an aggregation rule is applied to determine a compromise outcome. We require that the social classification should not be imposed, nor should it be manipulable. We prove that the only aggregation rules satisfying these properties are dictatorships.
Volume (Year): 08 (2012)
Issue (Month): 02 ()
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