The Rationality Of Fuzzy Choice Functions
If we assume that the preferences of a set of political actors are not cyclic, we would like to know if their collective choices are rationalizable. Given a fuzzy choice rule, do they collectively choose an alternative from the set of undominated alternatives? We consider necessary and sufficient conditions for a partially acyclic fuzzy choice function to be rationalizable. We find that certain fuzzy choice functions that satisfy conditions α and β are rationalizable. Furthermore, any fuzzy choice function that satisfies these two conditions also satisfies Arrow and Warp.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 04 (2008)
Issue (Month): 03 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.worldscinet.com/nmnc/nmnc.shtml|
|Order Information:|| Email: |
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wsi:nmncxx:v:04:y:2008:i:03:p:309-327. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Tai Tone Lim)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.