Subgame Consistent Solution For Cooperative Stochastic Dynamic Games With Random Horizon
In cooperative stochastic dynamic games a stringent condition — that of subgame consistency — is required for a dynamically stable cooperative solution. In particular, a cooperative solution is subgame consistent if an extension of the solution policy to a subgame starting at a later time with a state brought about by prior optimal behavior would remain optimal. This paper extends subgame consistent solutions to cooperative stochastic dynamic (discrete-time) games with random horizon. In the analysis new forms of the stochastic Bellman equation and the stochastic Isaacs–Bellman equation in discrete time are derived. Subgame consistent cooperative solutions are obtained for stochastic dynamic games. Analytically tractable payoff distribution mechanisms which lead to the realization of these solutions are developed. This is the first time that subgame consistent solutions for cooperative stochastic dynamic games with random horizon are presented.
Volume (Year): 14 (2012)
Issue (Month): 02 ()
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