Ranking Auctions: A Cooperative Approach
In this paper, we deal with situations arising from markets where an Internet search service provider offers a service of listing firms in decreasing order according to what they have bid. We call these ranking auction situations and introduce the corresponding TU-games. The core, as well as the two friendly solutions for the corners of the market, in this class of games can be easily described using a related assignment game. We study the Alexia value and the Shapley value of this type of games. Using these solutions, we show which circumstances in the game are in favor of the provider and which are beneficial to the bidders.
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Volume (Year): 14 (2012)
Issue (Month): 01 ()
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