Coordination In Games With Incomplete Information: Experimental Results
We use experiments to study coordination in games with incomplete information. In the games, one player knows the payoffs, while the other player knows the probability of payoffs forming a prisoner's dilemma or a stag-hunt. When payoffs form a stag-hunt there are two Pareto ranked pure strategy equilibria. We ask whether cheap talk aids coordination on the socially optimal equilibrium and whether the informed player can use cheap talk to engineer her preferred outcome. Consistent with previous literature, the benefit of cheap talk depends on the relationship between payoffs and risks, and in the games we study; cheap talk benefits informed players only when the stag-hunt payoffs exhibit low risks.
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Volume (Year): 13 (2011)
Issue (Month): 04 ()
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- Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
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