Noncooperative Games From Tu Games With Information Cost
From a special class of TU games with information cost, given by the problem of sharing the costs of facilities among users, we build a noncooperative game in which every player asks for the assessment of whom the users are. We analyze two models, "naming" game and majority decision game: the existence of equilibria is assured since the games are binary and symmetric, and then potential games. Since the games are ex-ante fair, we search a proposal to compensate for ex-post injustice.
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Volume (Year): 13 (2011)
Issue (Month): 03 ()
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