Stable Solutions On Matching Models With Quota Restriction
In this paper, we present a matching market in which an institution has to hire a set of pairs of complementary workers, and has a quota that is the maximum number of candidates pair positions to be filled. We define a stable solution and first show that in the unrestricted institution preferences domain, the set of stable solution may be empty and second we obtain a complete characterization of the stable sets under responsive restriction of the institution's preference.
Volume (Year): 13 (2011)
Issue (Month): 02 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.worldscinet.com/igtr/igtr.shtml|
|Order Information:|| Email: |
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:13:y:2011:i:02:p:159-179. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Tai Tone Lim)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.