The Strategic Cores Α, Β, Γ And Δ
In a strategic coalitional game, we consider the relations among four cores α, β, γ, and the one we call δ which is obtained by slightly weakening the conjectural cooperative equilibria due to Currarini and Marini. We show that the α-core and the γ-core are refined by the δ-core; and, moreover that if every player has a dominant strategy, the β-core is refined by the γ-core, so that the four cores refine themselves in the greek alphabetical order. Two economic games will be considered to show that the refinement of the α-core can vary from the weakest to the strongest. While the four cores are equal in the pure exchange game, a radical reduction of the α-core is obtained in the commons game, a simple version of the Cournot game, bringing about a single strategy profile as the δ-core.
Volume (Year): 13 (2011)
Issue (Month): 01 ()
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