A Note On The Weak Sequential Core Of Dynamic Tu Games
This paper addresses a problem with an argument in Kranich, Perea, and Peters  supporting their definition of the Weak Sequential Core and their characterization result. We also provide the remedy, a modification of the definition, to rescue the characterization.
Volume (Year): 12 (2010)
Issue (Month): 04 ()
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- Laurence Kranich & Andrés Perea & Hans Peters, 2005.
"Core Concepts For Dynamic Tu Games,"
International Game Theory Review (IGTR),
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 7(01), pages 43-61.
- Ray, Debraj, 1989. "Credible Coalitions and the Core," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 185-87.
- P. Herings & A. Predtetchinski & A. Perea, 2006.
"The Weak Sequential Core for Two-Period Economies,"
International Journal of Game Theory,
Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 55-65, April.
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