Coalitional Solution Of A Game-Theoretic Emission Reduction Model
In this paper the problem of allocation over time of total cost incurred by coalitions of countries in a coalitional game of pollution reduction is considered. The Nash equilibrium in the game played by coalitions is computed and then the value of each coalition is allocated according to some given mechanism between its members.
Volume (Year): 12 (2010)
Issue (Month): 03 ()
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