New Apportionment Methods Using Simple Games
This paper investigates the suitability of new apportionment methods based on the idea of preserving the coalition function of the simple game generated by the populations of the states of some country. The new methods fill a gap in the literature concerning apportionment methods based on winning coalitions. The main results in this paper show that the new apportionment methods do not satisfy desirable properties such as house monotonicity, quota, etc.
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Volume (Year): 12 (2010)
Issue (Month): 03 ()
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