A New Sequence Form Approach For The Enumeration And Refinement Of All Extreme Nash Equilibria For Extensive Form Games
This paper presents two new results on the enumeration of all extreme equilibria of the sequence form of a two person extensive game. The sequence form of an extensive game is expressed, for the first time to our knowledge, as a parametric linear 0 - 1 program. Considering Ext(P) as the set of all of the sequence form extreme Nash equilibria and Ext(Q) as the set of all the parametric linear 0 - 1 program extreme points, we show that Ext(P) ⊆ Ext(Q). Using exact arithmetics classes, the algorithm EχMIP Belhaiza (2002); Audet et al. (2006) is extended to enumerate all elements of Ext(Q). A small procedure is then applied in order to obtain all elements of Ext(P).
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 11 (2009)
Issue (Month): 04 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.worldscinet.com/igtr/igtr.shtml|
|Order Information:|| Email: |
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:11:y:2009:i:04:p:437-451. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Tai Tone Lim)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.