A Two-Step Shapley Value For Cooperative Games With Coalition Structures
In this paper, we study cooperative games with coalition structures. We show that a solution concept that applies the Shapley value to games among and within coalitions and in which the pure surplus that the coalition obtains is allocated among the intra-coalition members in an egalitarian way, is axiomatized by modified axioms on null players and symmetric players and the usual three axioms: efficiency, additivity and coalitional symmetry. In addition to the original definition, we give two expressions of this solution concept. One is an average of modified marginal contributions and the other is the weighted Shapley value of a game with restricted communication.
Volume (Year): 11 (2009)
Issue (Month): 02 ()
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