Network Formation, Cost-Sharing And Anti-Coordination
The objective of this work is to analyze how social networks coevolve with other dimensions of agents' choice. We present a model where agents choose their neighbors as well as a mode of behavior in 2 × 2 anti-coordination games, i.e. games where an individual's best response is to behave differently than the opponent. Links are costly. The cost of a link is shared between the two individuals involved in it, but not necessarily in a symmetric way. We characterize the set of Nash equilibria of the resulting social game and show how this set shrinks as the shares of the link cost are more equal. In the extreme case in which each agent pays half of the cost, there is a unique equilibrium. We also show that, as usual in the literature of network formation, there is a general misalignment between the stable and efficient states of the game.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 11 (2009)
Issue (Month): 01 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.worldscinet.com/igtr/igtr.shtml|
|Order Information:|| Email: |
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:11:y:2009:i:01:p:53-76. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Tai Tone Lim)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.