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Convex Games Versus Clan Games

  • RODICA BRANZEI

    (Faculty of Computer Science, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, Romania)

  • DINKO DIMITROV

    (Chair of Microeconomics, Faculty of Law and Economics, University of Bayreuth, Germany)

  • STEF TIJS

    (Center and Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University, The Netherlands)

In this paper we provide characterizations of convex games and total clan games by using properties of their corresponding marginal games. We show that a "dualize and restrict" procedure transforms total clan games with zero worth for the clan into monotonic convex games. Furthermore, each monotonic convex game generates a total clan game with zero worth for the clan by a "dualize and extend" procedure. These procedures are also useful for relating core elements and elements of the Weber set of the corresponding games.

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Article provided by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. in its journal International Game Theory Review.

Volume (Year): 10 (2008)
Issue (Month): 04 ()
Pages: 363-372

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Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:10:y:2008:i:04:p:363-372
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