Friendliness And Reciprocity In Equilibrium Selection
A concept of altruistic behavior (called friendly behavior) has been defined and used for equilibrium selection in some bargaining models in Rusinowska (2002), "Refinements of Nash Equilibria in view of Jealous and Friendly Behavior of Players", International Game Theory Review, 4, 281–299.In this paper, the situation in which every player has friendly behavior is incorporated into the general context of normal form games by introducing a new refinement concept (called friendliness equilibrium). Existence, properties and connections with another refinement concept, introduced by the authors in a previous paper and which captures an idea of reciprocal altruism, are investigated. Examples and counterexamples are given illustrating concepts, results and links with other classical refinement concepts.
Volume (Year): 10 (2008)
Issue (Month): 01 ()
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