Variational Stability Of Social Nash Equilibria
New results on the variational stability of social Nash equilibria are obtained using the class of sequentially pseudocontinuous functions. This class of functions strictly includes the class of sequentially continuous functions and finds a natural motivation in the framework of Choice and Economic Theory since it characterizes the continuity of the preference relations on first countable topological spaces. We investigate the connections with previous results and we show that it is not possible to improve our results further on.
Volume (Year): 10 (2008)
Issue (Month): 01 ()
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