The Centipede Of Rosenthal
In this short note we extend the very well known Centipede game of Rosenthal to the same extensive games with perfect information. The only difference that here the Centipede games have instead of numbers as payoff functions, they have variables. We introduce and study the relationship between the structure of subgame perfect equilibrium points (see Osborne (1994), Binmore (1994)) and the friendly equilibrium points due to Marchi (2004a) and (2004b). We solve an Asheim's conjecture (private communication).
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Volume (Year): 09 (2007)
Issue (Month): 02 ()
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